A House Divided: How Judicial Inaction and a Circuit Split Forfeited the First Amendment Rights of Student Journalists at America\u27s Universities by Ng, Richard Bradley
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 35
Number 2 Winter 2008 Article 8
1-1-2008
A House Divided: How Judicial Inaction and a
Circuit Split Forfeited the First Amendment Rights
of Student Journalists at America's Universities
Richard Bradley Ng
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard Bradley Ng, A House Divided: How Judicial Inaction and a Circuit Split Forfeited the First Amendment Rights of Student Journalists
at America's Universities, 35 Hastings Const. L.Q. 345 (2008).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol35/iss2/8
A House Divided:
How Judicial Inaction and a Circuit Split
Forfeited the First Amendment Rights of
Student Journalists at America's Universities
by RICHARD BRADLEY NG*
I. Introduction
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1 the Supreme Court of the
United States examined whether or not a high school principal's review and
censorship of a student newspaper offended the First Amendment.2
Although the Court held that high school administrators were accorded a
high degree of deference in such circumstances, 3 the Court expressly left
the question open over whether or not the analytical framework of
Hazelwood was applicable to the university setting.4 Without clear
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1. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
2. Id. at 262.
3. Id. at 271-73.
4. Id. at 273 n.7 ("A number of lower federal courts have similarly recognized that
educators' decisions with regard to the content of school-sponsored newspapers, dramatic
productions, and other expressive activities are entitled to substantial deference."); see, e.g.,
Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Seyfried v.
Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("We need
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guidance from the Supreme Court, the federal circuit courts have split on
whether or not the Hazelwood framework is applicable to the university
setting,5 leading to the current state of affairs in the United States: where
geographic location determines both the scope of public university student
journalists' First Amendment rights and the states' authority to regulate
university-sponsored speech at state-sponsored universities.
Since the circuits have split on the applicability of Hazelwood to the
university setting, geography defines the extent of both a student
journalist's First Amendment rights and the states' ability to regulate
university-sponsored speech at public universities.6 Although the Court
adopted a "wait-and-see" approach7 in Hazelwood,8 the time has come for
the Supreme Court to address the issue. Not only has the circuit split
created geographic disparities in the application of the First Amendment to
not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-
sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.").
5. See generally Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480
n.6 (lst Cir. 1989) (holding that Hazelwood is not applicable to student newspapers at public
universities); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (suggesting,
without deciding, that Hazelwood is not applicable to the college context); Hosty v. Carter, 412
F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that Hazelwood's framework applies to
subsidized student newspapers at public universities); Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 700-01
(9th Cir. 2005) (explicitly reserving the question of the extent Hazelwood applies to the university
setting); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Hazelwood is applicable to
a university's regulation of a student's curricular speech); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d
1277, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that Hazelwood is applicable to curricular speech in a
university setting); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
Hazelwood is applicable to the university setting); see also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,
433 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that the approach and
rationale of Hazelwood is equally applicable to the university context).
6. Since the First Amendment applies only against the federal and state governments,
Hazelwood could only apply to public universities, and as such, this note will not discuss the
interplay between university administrators' ability to regulate and student journalists' First
Amendment interests at private universities. See generally Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513
(1976); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1973); Public
Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
For discussion on student journalists' rights in the private university context, see generally Nancy
J. Whitmore, Vicarious Liability and the Private University Student Press, II COMM. L. & POL'Y
255 (2006).
7. See generally DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (holding that the Court is
without jurisdiction on grounds of mootness, refusing to pass upon constitutionality of affirmative
action policies, yet vacating the decision of the Washington Supreme Court rather than simply
dismissing the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of.").
8. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7.
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university student journalists,9 but, most importantly, the split has opened a
qualified immunity loophole that can easily be exploited by university
administrators who can claim, somewhat legitimately, that Hazelwood and
the subsequent circuit split on the applicability of the Hazelwood standard
to the college context has left the law unsettled.'0 Hence, as shown in
Hosty v. Carter," under Saucier v. Katz, 12 any public university official
who exercises a prior restraint on university-sponsored student publications
will escape 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability
13 through qualified immunity
4
because the law is not "clearly established."' 5  Ultimately, the Supreme
Court's failure to address whether Hazelwood is applicable to public
universities, and the resulting circuit split has constructively forfeited
university student journalists' remedies against First Amendment
encroachments by university officials. Hence, the Court must address the
issue and either reject or accept the application of Hazelwood to the
university context. By devising a uniform rule,16 the Supreme Court can
both clarify the rights and obligations of students and universities regarding
university-sponsored publications. Most importantly, by making the law
clearly established, the Court will close the qualified immunity loophole
and restore university student journalists' First Amendment rights.
This note will begin by exploring the background and application of
Hazelwood,'7 briefly touching upon First Amendment forum analysis,' 8 and
9. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738-39; see also supra note 5.
10. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738-39; see also Brown, 308 F.3d at 954.
11. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 731-39.
12. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007) provides that: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any fights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for
an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." Essentially, §
1983 creates a remedy, be it an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, to parties deprived of their constitutional rights by an official's abuse of his or her
position. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961).
14. Qualified immunity exists to protect governmental officials from being liable for
damages when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982) (emphasis added); see also infra Part IV.A.
15. See Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738-39.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part II.
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laying out the legal arguments made on both sides of the Hazelwood
debate.19 The note will then discuss how federal appellate courts, without
guidance from the Supreme Court, have split on the applicability of
Hazelwood to the university context,2 0 and the implications of that circuit
split on university student journalists' First Amendment rights in the
context of qualified immunity. The note then points out that as long as the
circuit courts remain split on the applicability of Hazelwood to the college
setting, qualified immunity protects administrative infringement of
university student journalists' First Amendment rights.2' The note
concludes by urging the Supreme Court to close the qualified immunity
loophole by granting certiorari and settling whether or not Hazelwood
22applies to the university setting.
II. The Background and Application of Hazelwood
In Hazelwood, the principal of Hazelwood East High School removed
articles from a school-sponsored newspaper for various pedagogical
reasons.23 The Court upheld the constitutionality of this action, holding
that a "school must be able to set high standards for the student speech that
is disseminated under its auspices-standards that may be higher than those
demanded by some newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in the
'real' world-and may refuse to disseminate student speech that does not
meet those standards., 24 Under Hazelwood, high school administrators are
allowed to edit or censor student speech when the speech is promulgated in
a non-public forum, such as a school-subsidized newspaper.
25
Furthermore, the Court held that the school retained the authority to refuse
to sponsor student speech that could be construed to associate the school
with inappropriate conduct or any position other than neutrality on issues of
controversy.26 The Court expressly reserved judgment as to whether or not
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part lI.B.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263-64 (1988).
24. Id. at 271-72.
25. Id. at 269.
26. Id. at 272 ("A school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech
that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct
otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order,' Bethel Sch. Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986), or to associate the school with any position other than
neutrality on matters of political controversy.").
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the Hazelwood standard would be applicable to the college setting.27 As a
result, the various circuit courts have adopted different rules regarding the
applicability of Hazelwood to the college setting, some applying
Hazelwood entirely,28 some rejecting Hazelwood entirely,29 others limiting
its application of Hazelwood,30 and others refusing to pass upon the issue,
instead waiting for the Supreme Court to provide guidance.31
A. Distinguishing Various Fora
Often, as was the case in Hazelwood and Hosty, the crucial analytical
juncture for a court in student media First Amendment cases is determining
whether the student media32 at issue is a public forum or a non-public
forum.33 In determining the level of restriction the government can place
on property 34 it controls, the Supreme Court has promulgated a two-part
forum analysis. 35  The Court must first determine whether the forum at
issue is public or non-public and then evaluate whether or not the speech
restrictions in question meet the required standard for that type of forum.
36
In the context of First Amendment free speech jurisprudence, the Court has
established three categories of fora: the traditional public forum, the
27. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7.
28. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (1 1th Cir. 1991); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d
731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
29. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Student Gov't Ass'n v.
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989).
30. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d
939, 949-51 (9th Cir. 2002).
31. Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 700-01 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Urofsky v. Gilmore,
216 F.3d 401, 433 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (suggesting, without
holding, that the approach and rationale of Hazelwood is equally applicable to the university
context, a point the majority did not address).
32. Although the Hazelwood Court, along with the courts in Axson-Flynn, Brown, Hosty,
Kincaid, and Student Gov't Ass 'n, all discussed various forms of written or print expression, the
analytical structure and rationale for these decisions would be just as applicable to other forms of
student media, such as radio or television, as it is to student newspapers. See Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 273 ("school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student
expression") (emphasis added); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1070-71 (applying Hazelwood to a university
classroom and instructor oral speech); see also Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737-38.
33. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-68; Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735-37.
34. A newspapers' publisher, like any other business, is considered a property interest. See
United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53, 55 (1963). Additionally, "[t]he publication of a newspaper
or magazine is strictly a private business that may be started or discontinued at the will of the
publisher." 58 AM. JUR. 2D Newspapers, Periodicals, and Press Associations § 7 (2006); see
also Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951).
35. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
36. Id.
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designated public forum, and the non-public forum.3 7 These distinctions
are crucial, as the scope of governmental power to regulate speech is
defined by the type of forum involved;38 restrictions exceeding the scope of
that power run afoul of the First Amendment.
39
1. Traditional Public Fora
Traditional public fora include places that have traditionally been open
to public expression,40 such as sidewalks or public plazas. 41 The Supreme
Court made clear that any content regulation of speech in a traditional
public forum was subject to strict scrutiny:42 The regulation of speech must
serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve
that interest.43 Moreover, in a traditional public forum, "[t]he State may
also enforce [content-neutral] regulations of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are... narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication." 44 In effect, the strict scrutiny standard, as applied to First
Amendment free speech claims, means, as the Hosty court noted, "no
censorship [is] allowed.
4 5
2. Designated Public Fora
The second category, designated public fora, is composed of property
the government has intentionally opened to the general public for
46expressive activity. The creation of a designated public forum is not
accidental, but rather, as the Supreme Court made clear in Cornelius, "[t]he
government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting
37. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1983).
38. Id. at 44-47.
39. Id.; see also Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
40. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995); see also
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 519 (2006).
41. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Hague, 307 U.S. at 515); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 480 (1988).
42. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 387 (2006).
43. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 461) ("In these quintessential public
forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a
content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.").
44. Id. at 45 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
45. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
46. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
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limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening up a forum for public
discourse., 47 The government can create a designated public forum for the
limited purposes of use by specific groups, or for the discussion of certain
topics. 48 Likewise, the government is not required to retain the open nature
of the forum for perpetuity,49 but as long as it does, "it is bound by the
same standards as apply in a traditional public forum. ' '50  Hence, as in a
traditional public forum, "[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations
are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to
effectuate a compelling state interest. 51  Although the government may
engage in content discrimination52 to preserve the limits of the designated
public forum, the government cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination,
even in a designated public forum of its own creation.53
The Court has made it clear that the right to free speech in a public
forum extends to public universities,54 and hence, determining whether a
student publication 55 can be classified as a public forum, either traditional
or designated, 56 or a non-public forum, necessarily defines the scope of
First Amendment protection available to the student publication and
university authority to regulate student speech.
57
3. Non-Public Fora
Finally, the third category of government property is the non-public
forum, which is composed of places that have not traditionally been
47. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
48. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); City of
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)).
49. Id. at 46.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Content-based discrimination must be narrowly drawn and serve a compelling
governmental interest. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
53. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995); see
also id. at 829 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)) ("When the government
targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the
First Amendment is all the more blatant... [v]iewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form
of content discrimination.").
54. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 522 (2006);
cf Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
55. The Hazelwood framework is equally applicable to other forms of student media. See
supra note 32.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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designated for public expressive activity.5 8 The Supreme Court has made
clear that the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to property
simply because it is owned or controlled by the government." 59 Rather, in
a non-public forum the government is given wide regulatory latitude. 60 As
the Perry Court made clear, "[i]n addition to time, place, and manner
regulations, the [government] may reserve the forum for its intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech
is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view." 61  Thus, as long as a
governmental regulation on free speech is reasonable and not tantamount to
viewpoint discrimination, the regulation will stand;62 for state educators, at
all levels, this standard allows for an enormous amount of judicial
deference.63
4. Hazelwood Only Applies to Non-Public Fora
Hence, in the university context, student media classified as non-
public fora are subject to administrative review.64 Administrative review of
student media is proper, as long as the rationale for the review is reasonable
and not meant to suppress opposing viewpoints.65 It is within this category,
and this category alone, that Hazelwood is applicable.66
58. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
59. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981); see
also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §
518 (2006).
60. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985);
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 519 (2006).
61. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) ("[the] State,
no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.").
62. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
63. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003); Hazelwood Sch. Dist v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,
225-26 (1985); Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 325 (1975); Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., Torrance Unified Sch. Dist.,
682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981); Trachtman v.
Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
64. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Bishop v.
Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (11 th Cir. 1991).
65. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.




Analytically, the application of Hazelwood is contingent upon the




Can school officials show that they have a reasonable
academic purpose for their censorship and that the
censorship was not intended to silence a particular





In keeping with the Supreme Court's well-established non-public fora
jurisprudence,68 Hazelwood articulates "that educators do not offend the
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
67. Student Press Law Center, First Amendment Rights of Public High School Student
Journalists After Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, http://splc.org/pdf/hazdiagram.pdf
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (modified from original and edited for relevance).
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."
69
Hence, Hazelwood reaffirms the Court's well-established standard for non-
public fora, reasonable regulation of speech with no intention to suppress
expression,7° while clarifying the application of the standard to the
educational context. 71  In Hazelwood, the Court made clear that that
editorial control over student media must be "reasonably related" 72 to a
legitimate state interest, which, in the educational context, includes
"legitimate pedagogical concerns." 73  Hence, as the Bishop, Brown, and
Hosty courts noted, Hazelwood provides a useful framework for courts to
apply to non-public fora in the educational context.74
B. The Legal Arguments
Since the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue,75 to determine
whether the deferential Hazelwood standard should apply to the university
setting, lower federal courts are forced to balance two competing traditions,
both of which are grounded in well-established Supreme Court
jurisprudence: first, judicial deference to the academic decisions of public
school officials, 76 and second, the necessity of protecting free speech and
expression by curtailing governmental regulation on the exercise of the
right.77 It is within the context of this delicate balancing act that advocates
for both sides find traction.
1. The Argument for Applying Hazelwood to the University Setting
Because Hazelwood follows in the Court's tradition of judicial
deference to the decisions of public school officials, 78 it should come as no
69. Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (emphasis added).
70. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
71. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 302; Hosty,
412 F.3d at 734.
72. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
73. Id. at 273; see also Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734.
74. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (11 th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939,
951 (9th Cir. 2002); Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735.
75. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7; Brown, 308 F.3d at 949; Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734.
76. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 325 (1975).
77. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-72 (1964); see also
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 41-43 (1971); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
346-47 (1946); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § § 451-53 (2007).
78. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 ("This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view
that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and
state and local school officials, and not of federal judges"); see also id. at 273 n.7 ("A number of
lower federal courts have similarly recognized that educators' decisions with regard to the content
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surprise that public university officials and educational organizations 79
would argue for its application at the university level. Hence, that
argument begins with the premise that the Hazelwood standard should be
applied to school-sponsored expressive activities on college campuses
because the standard reflects the Supreme Court's traditional deference to
the academic decisions of college administrators and faculty. 0
a. The Hazelwood Standard Is Concurrent With the Traditional
Deference the Court Has Shown School Administrators and Faculty
The Court has traditionally granted deference to the decisions of
public school officials, both high school81 and college,82 holding that judges
should not override academic decisions unless the conduct is such a radical
departure from norms that it demonstrates the official responsible failed to
exercise professional judgment.8 3 The Court also has held "[i]t is not the
role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators
which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. 84
The Wood Court makes it clear that federal courts lack the expertise to
resolve questions of educational policy.85  Thus, as the Axson-Flynn,
Bishop, Brown, and Hosty decisions indicate, it stands to reason that federal
courts also lack the expertise to resolve questions of university
administrative policy regarding school-subsidized publications.8 6 Not only
has the Court deferred to the judgment of school officials in the
administrative context, but also the Court has given public school officials
wide latitude on issues of major constitutional importance. 8' Even in a
of school-sponsored newspapers, dramatic productions, and other expressive activities are entitled
to substantial deference.").
79. Id. at 262. (The National School Boards Association ("NSBA") filed an amicus curiae
brief in Hazelwood, supporting the principal's decision to exercise editorial control over the
student newspaper and urging the Court to hold that there was no First Amendment violation).
80. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225-26.
81. See, e.g., Wood, 420 U.S. at 326; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
82. See, e.g., Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225-26; Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
83. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225-26.
84. Wood, 420 U.S. at 326.
85. Id.
86. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1288-93 (10th Cir. 2004); Bishop v. Aronov,
926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (1 1th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2002); Hosty
v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2005) (en bane); cf Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225-26; Horowitz,
435 U.S. at 90.
87. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). This decision is commonly referred
to as Brown II but because this note also discusses the Ninth Circuit's decision in Brown, 308
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subject as constitutionally important as school desegregation, the Court
88
deferred to the judgment of public school officials. 89 Rather than order the
lower federal courts to actively supervise the remedial implementation, the
Court essentially remanded the remedial implementation to the public
school officials who were responsible for segregating the public school in
the first place. 90 Thus, even in the context of fundamental constitutional
rights, the Court defers to the judgment of public school administrators. 91
Hence, the application of the Hazelwood standard to the college setting
further affirms the Court's longstanding policy of substantially deferring to
the decisions of school officials as in Ewing and Wood.
92
b. The School's Interests Described in Hazelwood Are Equally
Applicable to Both the High School and College Setting
Both the high school in Hazelwood and public universities have
similar interests regarding school-subsidized newspapers, which suggests
that the Hazelwood standard is equally applicable. 93  In Hazelwood, the
Court held that high school officials were entitled to exercise editorial
control over school-subsidized speech.94 In Papish, the Court held that
university officials could not impose sanctions against a student for
distributing an off-campus, non-school-subsidized newspaper. 95  As the
F.3d 939, Brown II will hereafter be referred to as Brown v. Bd. II. Likewise, Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (commonly known as Brown 1) will be referred to as Brown v. Bd. L
88. It should be noted that Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the highly deferential Brown v.
Bd. II opinion. Chief Justice Warren, as the reader is probably aware, was widely considered one
of the most liberal and progressive Supreme Court justices in the history of the United States.
Moreover, Chief Justice Warren believed the Court's proper place was the active defense of civil
liberties. See Oyez.com, Earl Warren - Biography, http://www.oyez.org/justices/earl-warren/
(last visited March 8, 2007); see generally ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL
WARREN (ED CRAY ED., SIMON & SCHUSTER) (1997). Hence, it is rather striking that even he,
an activist progressive justice, would defer to the judgment of (usually racist) public school
officials in the school desegregation context.
89. Brown v. Bd. II, 349 U.S. at 299.
90. Id. ("Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of
varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing, and solving these problems.") (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. See supra note 86.
93. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734-36 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
94. Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlneier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
95. Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670-671 (1973); cf Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-200 (1991) ("When the government disburses public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure
that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.").
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Hosty court noted, age is not a dispositive distinction.96 Rather, the
distinguishing factor is whether or not the school subsidized the student
speech.97 Often, student publications are subsidized by the university 98 and
supervised by a faculty member. 99 Thus, if university officials cannot
sanction non-school-subsidized speech in Papish,'00 the logical corollary is
that university officials, under the Hazelwood holding, can exercise greater
control over school-subsidized student speech. l01 In that vein, the Court
reasoned that school officials have an interest in ensuring that student
speech published under its auspices meets the high standards of journalistic
integrity. 102 As the Hosty court noted, this concern is equally applicable to
the university setting; 10 3 college officials have just as much of an interest in
ensuring that student media published under the auspices of the university
meet proper journalistic standards. 
04
For example, the Code of Ethics for the Society of Professional
Journalists provides that journalists should "be honest, fair and courageous
in gathering, reporting and interpreting information."' 0 5 It also provides
that journalists should "[a]void conflicts of interest, real or perceived," and
"[d]isclose unavoidable conflicts."' 1 6 In Hosty, the university dean justified
her decision to exercise administrative review over the student newspaper,
stating that she wanted a faculty advisor to "to check for journalistic
quality, including grammar and spelling," in light of the student editors'
"fail[ure] to follow journalistic standards for fairness and good
grammar.'' 1 7 Likewise, the Illinois College Press Association ("ICPA")
96. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734 ("Not that any line could be bright; many high school seniors are
older than some college freshmen, and junior colleges are similar to many high schools."); see
also id. at 735 (citing Symposium, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights As
Adults?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3-313 (2004) ("The Supreme Court itself has established that age
does not control the public-forum question.")).
97. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 n.3.
98. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737.
99. Id.; see also CONST. UCLA COMMC'NS BD. art. III, § A, available at
http://www.studentmedia.ucla.edu/constitution.pdf.
100. Papish, 410 U.S. at 670-671.
101. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Hosty, 412 F.3d at 736.
102. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
103. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735-36.
104. Id.
105. CODE OF ETHICS (Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists 1996), available at
http://www.spj.org/pdf/ethicscode.pdf.
106. Id.
107. Jeffrey R. Young, Censorship or Quality Control? Lawsuit by Student-Newspaper
Editors Tests How Much Oversight Administrators Can Assert, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 9,
2002, at Students 36.
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determined that the student editors in Hosty had committed numerous
ethical violations. 0 8 Specifically, the ICPA pointed out that the student
editors had numerous conflicts of interest, that the faculty advisor's use of
an editorial to advance a personal agenda was improper, and that the line
between news and commentary was blurred at times. 109 Hence, in Hosty, it
was reasonable for the university administration to have an active interest
in ensuring that the student newspaper complied with journalistic
standards," 0 an interest Hazelwood identifies as legitimate."'
Moreover, the Supreme Court has given the government wide latitude
to regulate speech when the government itself is the speaker. 12  The
Hazelwood Court held that school officials had the prerogative to ensure
that school-sponsored student speech did not associate the school with
conduct inconsistent with "the shared values of a civilized social order,""11
3
or with any viewpoint other than neutrality on issues of controversy."
14
Like the high school principal in Hazelwood, university officials have an
interest in ensuring that their school's media do not associate the university
with inappropriate conduct or any viewpoint other than neutrality on
controversial issues in order to maintain an inclusive academic
environment for the entire university population.' 15 Additionally, like
school officials in Hazelwood, university officials also have a significant
interest in exercising editorial control over student publications to ensure
inappropriate or false content was not printed under the school's
auspices. 1 16
Likewise, in Rosenberger, the Court made clear that it has "permitted
the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when
it is the speaker."' 17 In the same vein, the Court has upheld conditional
governmental funding contingent on speech regulation." 8  In Rust, the
Court permitted the government to prohibit recipients of federal funds for
108. Id.; see also March 2001 Memorandum From Illinois College Press Association,
http://collegefreedom.org/ICPA.htm (last visited March 8, 2007).
109. See supra note 103.
110. Young, supra note 102; see also Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734-36 (7th Cir. 2005)
(en banc).
111. Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988).
112. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
113. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986)). Such conduct includes "drug or alcohol use" and "irresponsible sex." Id.
114. Id.
115. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734-35.
116. Id. at 735; see also Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11 th Cir. 1991).
117. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
118. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
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family planning counseling from providing abortion-related advice. 1 9 Like
Hazelwood and Rosenberger, the Rust Court "recognized that when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its
own it is entitled to say what it wishes."'2 ° Taken together, these cases
stand for the well-established proposition that the government is given
considerable latitude to regulate speech when the speech is offered on
behalf of the government.
Although universities could adopt an even-handed policy allowing all
voices to be expressed in the school-sponsored publication, universities are
not required to do so.121  Aside from the practical difficulties of
implementing such a policy, 122 it runs contrary to the well-established
propositions that the government may regulate speech when it is the
speaker,123 and that public schools may retain the authority to decide with
which positions it will associate itself.124 Taken as a whole, the interests of
administrators at both the high school and college level that pertain to
school-subsidized student speech are very similar. As the Seventh Circuit
held in respect to this issue, "there is no sharp difference between high
school and college papers.' 25 Because of the Supreme Court's tradition of
showing substantial deference to the academic decisions of educators and
because the interests involved are very similar, applying the Hazelwood
framework to the university setting continues the Court's jurisprudential
tradition of deferring to the decisions of public school officials.
2. The Argument Against Applying Hazelwood to the University Setting
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has always closely guarded the
First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. In fact, "[t]he safeguarding
119. Id. at 173.
120. Id. at 194.
121. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993);
Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 928 (10th Cir. 2002); cf Rust, 500
U.S. at 193.
122. For example, if public schools, both high schools and colleges, are required to adopt
such an even-handed policy (as opposed to one where the school can exercise discretion to ensure
neutrality) then the school-sponsored publication must counterbalance every view on a
controversial subject with the opposite view on that subject. Aside from being impractical, it is
simply not required. See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 928 (holding that there is "[n]o doubt the school
could promote student speech advocating against drug use, without being obligated to sponsor
speech with the opposing viewpoint.").
123. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
124. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 928 n.8.
125. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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of free speech and a free press is a national constitutional policy. ' 126 Both
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly reaffirmed
that the freedom of speech is one of the most fundamental and important
rights in an open, democratic society. 127 Hence, students' rights and free
speech advocacy groups have continued to urge the Court to protect the
free speech rights of public school students.
128
a. Hazelwood Censorship is Inconsistent With a University's Purpose as
"Marketplaces of Ideas"
As an initial matter, it is argued that the application of Hazelwood is
incongruent with universities' central purpose as the "vital centers for the
Nation's intellectual life" that have traditionally been "voluntary and
spontaneous assemblages or concourses for students to speak and to write
and to learn."' 129 In fact, the Supreme Court frequently refers to the college
setting as the "marketplace of ideas.' 130 The Healy Court went on to note
that "the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools."' 131 More recently, the
Court has observed that the university's key purpose was to facilitate a
wide range of speech. 132  Hence, the restrictive standard of Hazelwood
stands in direct contrast to the Court's well-established tradition of
protecting college students' free speech rights. Since the mission of public
high schools is the "inculcation of ... values,"'133 the Hazelwood standard
is appropriate. In the college context, however, where the mission is the
free exchange of ideas,134 the Hazelwood standard is not only inappropriate,
but is in complete disharmony with the Court's "reaffirm[ations of] this
126. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 451 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bridges v. Cal., 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
127. Id. at §§ 451-53.
128. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") filed an amicus brief in
support of the high school journalism students in Hazelwood. 484 U.S. at 262. Likewise, the
Student Press Law Center ("SPLC") filed an amicus brief supporting the student editors in Hosty.
412 F.3d at 732.
129. Rosenberger v. Rector& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995).
130. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); Sweezy v. N.H. by Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957)).
131. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
132. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231 (2000)
("Recognition must be given as well to the important and substantial purposes of the University,
which seeks to facilitate a wide range of speech.").
133. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
134. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom."'' 35 On one hand,
the Supreme Court has articulated a clear line of cases that are based on the
underlying notion that "the constitutional rights of students in public school
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings,"' 136 and that those rights must be "applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment."'' 37 On the other hand, the Court
has articulated a separate line of cases that articulate that college students
and campuses are to be accorded the same free speech protections as the
general public.' 38  Hazelwood followed the Fraser and Tinker line of
decisions and was premised on the need for public school officials to
exercise editorial control to protect "immature audiences.' 39  Moreover,
Hazelwood was also based on the role public school officials have "as 'a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment."",140  Thus, the underlying rationale is simply not
applicable in the college context, especially in light of the Court's
proclamation that "the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view
that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment
protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large."'
' 4'
b. The Rationale of Hazelwood Is Inapplicable to the University Setting
In addition to having different core educational missions,14 numerous
fundamental differences exist between the high school context and the
university context. Although the Supreme Court has noted that age is not a
dispositive factor, 143 in Hazelwood, the Court suggested that the maturity of
the audience was a relevant consideration. 44 The Hazelwood Court held
that censorship in the high school context was reasonable in light of the
135. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81.
136. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 469.
137. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
138. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81; Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667,
670 (1973); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981).
139. Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
140. Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. 1, 347 U.S. at 493) (emphasis added).
141. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.
142. Compare Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 with Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-8 1.
143. See Symposium, supra note 96.
144. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72.
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relative immaturity of the audience.1 45 That rationale is not applicable to
the college context. In fact, the Supreme Court has granted broad First
Amendment protection to the university setting because college students
are more mature. 146  The Court has explicitly recognized this inherent
distinction, observing that "college students are less impressionable and
less susceptible to religious indoctrination [than high school students],"' 47
and that "[u]niversity students are, of course, young adults. They are less
impressionable than younger students."
' 148
In fact, society's expectations of high school students and college
students are fundamentally different. 49 As common knowledge suggests,
while high school students are required to attend school and follow a
proscribed curriculum, 150 college students have much more latitude in
determining the course of their education. 5' Or, as Justice Souter noted,
"[o]ur... cases dealing with the right of teaching institutions to limit
expressive freedom of students have been confined to high schools,
whose students and their schools' relation to them are different and
at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college
education."
152
Reinforced by the very different missions of public high schools and
public universities, 5 3 the fundamental differences between high school and
college students suggests that the underlying rationale of Hazelwood-the
need to protect younger students from inappropriate speechl 54 -- is entirely
inappropriate for the university setting. As one commentator has
suggested, "if college students are presumed to be mature enough to take
on the responsibilities placed on them by society and the college, then
145. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
146. Daniel A. Applegate, Note, Stop the Presses: The Impact of Hosty v. Carter and Pitt
News v. Pappert on the Editorial Freedom of College Newspapers, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
247, 264-71 (2005) (discussing both the inherent differences between high school and college
students in terms of age and the legal significance of attaining the age of majority).
147. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
148. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981)..
149. Applegate, supra note 146, at 265-67; see also Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, Demoted to
High School: Are College Students' Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High School
Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173, 195-97 (2003).
150. Applegate, supra note 146, at 266.
151. Id.
152. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (internal citations omitted).
153. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
154. Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988).
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student editors must also be presumed mature enough to exercise editorial
freedom in their college newspapers, and the college audience must be
presumed mature enough to be exposed to sensitive or controversial topics
within those newspapers."' 
55
Moreover, an increasing number of states are in agreement, 156 enacting
legislation to minimize the effects of Hazelwood.157  While Hazelwood
reduced the scope of First Amendment free speech protection available to
high school student journalists, 158 each of the states that passed "anti-
Hazelwood" legislation expanded the free speech protection for student
journalists under state law, giving student journalists a state court forum to
litigate infringements upon their right to free speech. 159 In the context of
the university setting, immediately following the decision in Hosty, an
attorney for the California State University ("CSU") system sent a
memorandum to CSU administrators, advising them that "CSU campuses
may have more latitude than previously believed to censor the content of
subsidized student newspapers."'' 60 In a bill introduced by Assemblyman
Leland Yee and signed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, the State of
California responded to the Hosty decision by passing legislation that
effectively denies the application of the Hazelwood standard to the
university setting while reaffirming that California university student
journalists enjoy the same extensive free speech protection'16  that
California high school students enjoy.
162
155. Applegate, supra note 146, at 267.
156. The following states have passed "anti-Hazelwood" laws: Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Washington. See Student Press Law
Center, State Student Free Expression Laws, http://splc.org/stateantihazlaws.asp (last visited Mar.
8, 2007).
157. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-1201 to -1204 (2006); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (Deering
2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-120 (2007); IOWA CODE § 280.22 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
72-1504-1506 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 71, § 82 (2006); 22 PA. CODE § 12-9 (2006);
WASH. ADMIN. CODE 180-40-215 (2006); see also Mike Hiestand, Understanding "anti-
Hazelwood" laws, TRENDS IN HIGH SCHOOL MEDIA, January 23, 2001,
http://www.studentpress.org/nspa/trends/-lawl0lhs.htnl [hereinafter Understanding].
158. Understanding, supra note 157.
159. Id.
160. Mike Hiestand, California leads way with "anti-Hosty" laws, TRENDS IN COLLEGE
MEDIA, Nov. 1, 2006, http://www.studentpress.org/acp/trends/l-awl06college.html [hereinafter
California Leads].
161. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (Deering 2006).
162. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation to
Protect Student Freedom of Speech (Aug. 28, 2006), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/3659/; see also California Leads, supra note 160.
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Hence, as recognized by both scholarly commentators1 63 and an
increasing number of state govemments,' 64 it is arguably clear that the
Hosty court inappropriately applied the Hazelwood standard to the
university setting, a setting distinguishable from public high schools.
III. A House Divided: Federal Circuits Split in
Applying Hazelwood
Advocates on both sides of the Hazelwood issue have propounded
compelling, appealing arguments, both grounded in well-established
Supreme Court precedence. 165 Hence, it is no surprise that federal appellate
jurists have balanced the competing interests1 66 differently and split on the
applicability of the Hazelwood standard. 67  Because the Supreme Court
expressly reserved judgment as to whether or not the Hazelwood standard
would be applicable to the college setting, 168 federal appellate jurists have
been forced to predict whether or not the Supreme Court would apply
Hazelwood to the university setting. 69 As a result, both inter- and intra-
circuit conflicts exists on whether or not the Hazelwood framework for free
speech analysis is applicable to the university setting, which, when coupled
with Hazelwood's express reservation of the issue, had opened a qualified
immunity loophole for nefarious university administrators who may seek to
unconstitutionally censor student media. 
170
163. See Applegate, supra note 146; Martin, supra note 149; see also Virginia J. Nimick,
Note, Schoolhouse Rocked: Hosty v. Carter and the Case Against Hazelwood, 14 J.L. & POL'Y
941 (2006); Laura K. Schulz, Note, A "Disacknowledgment" of Post-Secondary Student Free
Speech - Brown v. Li and the Applicability of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier to the Post-Secondary
Setting, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1185 (2003).
164. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
166. Those competing interests being the tradition of judicial deference to the decisions of
public school officials, see, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26
(1985), versus the need for limited constriction on the First Amendment free speech guarantee in
the context of public universities. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
167. See supra note 5.
168. Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988).
169. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We do not know with certainty that the
Supreme Court would hold that Hazelwood controls the inquiry.").
170. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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A. Courts That Apply Hazelwood To The University Setting
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have both held that Hazelwood is
applicable to the college setting.'17  In Axson-Flynn, the Tenth Circuit,
while admitting that it was "not unmindful of the differences in maturity
between university and high school students" still "appl[ied] Hazelwood to
[the] university context. 172 The Axson-Flynn court found it persuasive that
the speech occurred within the curricular setting, 173 lending support to the
proposition that university-sponsored student newspapers, if overseen by a
faculty member, would be subject to editorial control by the administration
for legitimate academic purposes. Likewise, in Bishop, the Eleventh
Circuit applied Hazelwood to curricular speech within a college
classroom,1 74 and noted that although Hazelwood and its progeny had not
been applied to the college context, the rationale of Hazelwood was
applicable "insofar as it covers the extent to which an institution may limit
in-school expressions which suggest the school's approval."' 75 Hence, the
Eleventh Circuit's decision also lends considerable support to the
proposition that a school-sponsored student newspaper (as an "expression
which suggest[s] the school's approval") 176  would be subject to
administrative editorial control.
However, that proposition finds its strongest support from the Seventh
Circuit's ruling in Hosty.177 In Hosty, the circuit panel held that Hazelwood
was not applicable to the college setting. 178  The court, sitting en banc,
overturned the decision, holding that Hazelwood was applicable to the
university context 179 and that it applied specifically to university student
newspapers that operated in a non-public forum. 18 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that in terms of the interests of the school, 18 there was no sharp
171. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 2004); Bishop v. Aronov,
926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (i1 th Cir. 1991).
172. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289.
173. Id.
174. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071, 1074.
175. Id. at 1074.
176. Id.
177. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
178. Id. at 733.
179. Id. at 735.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 734-35 ("To the extent that the justification depends on other matters-not only
the desire to ensure 'high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under [the
school's] auspices' (the Court particularly mentioned 'speech that is... ungrammatical, poorly
written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for
immature audiences', Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)) but also the
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difference between public high schools and public colleges. 82 Moreover,
the Hosty court reasoned that "[i]f private speech in a public forum is off-
limits to regulation even when that forum is a classroom of an elementary
school.., then speech at a non-public forum, and underwritten at public
expense, may be open to reasonable regulation even at the college level.'
' 83
The Hosty court further reasoned that if "the federal government may insist
that physicians," who are clearly mature adults entitled to full First
Amendment protection, "use grant funds only for the kind of speech
required by the granting authority," then it stood to reason that university-
sponsored student newspapers must submit to administrative editorial
control. 
1 84
B. Courts That Reject Hazelwood In the University Setting
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, took the opposite course of the
Seventh Circuit, initially ruling that Hazelwood was applicable to the
college setting, 185 only to reverse itself en banc. 1 86 There, the Kincaid court
glossed over the issue of Hazelwood's applicability to the university
setting, and instead reasoned that "[b]ecause we find that a forum analysis
requires that the yearbook be analyzed as a limited public forum-rather
than a non-public forum-we agree with the parties that Hazelwood has
little application to this case."' 187  Although the Sixth Circuit chose to
distinguish Hazelwood on other grounds, namely forum classification,188
the Sixth Circuit supported their reasoning by citing the First Circuit's
decision in Student Government Association v. Board of Trustees of
University of Massachusetts.1 89
In Student Gov 't Ass 'n, the First Circuit held that Hazelwood was not
applicable to college newspapers. 190 However, the First Circuit provided
no rationale for the holding, except for a citation to the Hazelwood Court's
footnote that expressly reserved the question of applicability to the
goal of dissociating the school from 'any position other than neutrality on matters of political
controversy,' id. at 272-there is no sharp difference between high school and college papers.").
182. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734-35.
183. Id. at 735 (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)).
184. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Nat'l Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)).
185. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).




190. Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (tst Cir.
1989).
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university setting. 191 The text of Hazelwood's footnote is unambiguous:
"We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is
appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the
college and university level."' 92 From this language, as the Hosty court
pointed out in criticism, 93 the First Circuit decided that the Supreme Court
held that the standard does not apply to the university setting. Hence,
without any support for its proposition, the rationale of the Student Gov't
Ass 'n court is ambiguous. Likewise, as the Hosty court also pointed out in
criticism, 194 the rationale of the Kincaid court, which cited Student Gov't
Ass 'n, is ambiguous.
C. The Ninth Circuit's Inconsistency on Hazelwood
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast to either side of the Hazelwood debate,
has approached the issue in an inconsistent manner. In Brown, decided in
2002, the three judge panel issued three separate opinions. 95 While the
opinion for the court applied the Hazelwood standard to the university
setting, 96 the Hosty court adeptly pointed out that "the members of the
[Brown] panel articulated three distinct and incompatible views about
whether Hazelwood applies to collegiate settings and how the [F]irst
[A]mendment affects relations between college faculty and students'
expression."' 97 Despite this, Brown stood for the proposition that, in the
Ninth Circuit, Hazelwood applied to the university setting when the student
speech involved was curricular in nature.' 98
However, three years later and in spite of Brown's holding, the Ninth
Circuit, in Hudson, applied Hazelwood for the proposition that "[colleges]
ha[ve] a strong and recognized interest in maintaining [their] political
neutrality as an educational institution, ' 99 but then declared that the court
"need not consider whether a college necessarily has the same leeway as a
high school to preserve that neutrality."200 At best, Hudson and Brown can
191. Id.
192. Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (emphasis added).
193. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
194. Id. at 738-39 ("[Kincaid] stat[ed], in reliance on the parties' agreement, that Hazelwood
has 'little application' to collegiate publications but [did] not explain what this means, or how a
constitutional framework can apply 'just a little."').
195. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 939-66 (9th Cir. 2002).
196. Id. at 949.
197. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739.
198. Brown, 308 F.3d at 949-50.
199. Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 700 (9th Cir. 2005).
200. Id. at 701.
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be reconciled to indicate that the Ninth Circuit has decided Hazelwood is
applicable to the university setting, but has yet to decide the extent to
which Hazelwood actually applies. At worst, the two decisions indicate
that the Ninth Circuit, the largest and, arguably, most diverse circuit court
in terms of judicial composition, °1 cannot settle on a consistent standard
regarding the applicability of Hazelwood to the university setting.
IV. The Qualified Immunity Loophole
A. An Overview of Qualified Immunity
When considering qualified immunity for a public official, the
Supreme Court promulgated a two part test: first, whether or not, if taken in
a light most favorable to the complainants, the conduct of the official
violated a constitutional right, and, if it did, whether or not that right was
clearly established. °2 Essentially, qualified immunity exists to protect
governmental officials from liability for damages when "their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known., 20 3 The Supreme Court recently
summarized the purpose of qualified immunity when it stated that
"[q]ualified immunity shields an official from suit when she makes a
decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends
the law governing the circumstances she confronted., 20 4 Or, as the Hosty
court phrased the issue: "[p]ublic officials need not predict, at their
financial peril, how constitutional uncertainties will be resolved.,
20 5
B. The Qualified Immunity Loophole Is Wide Open for College
Administrators
In the context of university student media, when a college
administrator does violate student journalists' First Amendment rights, the
next step in the Saucier qualified immunity test is to ask whether those
rights were clearly established at the time the public official committed the
allegedly unconstitutional act.206 In the context of qualified immunity,
201. See Symposium, Ninth Circuit Conference: Introduction, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 221, 221-23
(2006); see also U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, List of the Ninth Circuit Judges,
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/519a025470af2daf88256406008016b7/3c0c3c8
feae803ec882572b8005fd216/$FILE/judgeWeb.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
202. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)..
203. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
204. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206).
205. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
206. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
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"clearly established" means that "the contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right. 2 °7
In Hazelwood, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether
university administrators were entitled to the same level of deference as
high school administrators in regulating school-subsidized newspapers.20 8
As the Hosty court pointed out by citing Wilson v. Layne, "the Supreme
Court does not identify for future decision questions that already have
'clearly established' answers. 20 9 In Wilson, the Supreme Court held that
"[i]fjudges... disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject
[the government] to money damages for picking the losing side of the
controversy. 210
Without direction from the Supreme Court, federal circuit courts are
split on whether or not Hazelwood applies to the university setting. 211 If
federal appellate jurists cannot agree on what it is "clearly established" law,
it seems presumptive to expect a university administrator to be aware of
what the law is. Hence, the Hazelwood Court's inaction coupled with the
circuit split has left the law unsettled,212 which in turn, opened a qualified
immunity loophole that can easily be exploited by any public university
official whom exercises a prior restraint on university-sponsored student
publications to escape 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.1 3 As Wilson made clear,
where judges disagree, the government, even if acting unconstitutionally,
will escape liability through qualified immunity. In the context of
university student media, the Court's failure to address whether Hazelwood
is applicable to the college context has led the circuits to sharply disagree
on the law. Under Saucier and Wilson, this has ultimately resulted in a
constructive forfeiture of university student journalists' remedies against
First Amendment encroachments by university officials. One needs to look
no further than the Hosty decision to see this loophole in action. Even
when the court conceded that it was possible for the student newspaper to
have been operating as a designated public forum,214 the Seventh Circuit
207. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
208. Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n.3 (1988).
209. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-18 (1999)).
210. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618.
211. See supra note 5.
212. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738-39.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 737-38.
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held that the university dean2 15 was entitled to qualified immunity, in spite
of an alleged egregious constitutional violation, because the law was not
clearly established.
2 16
Therefore, to the extent that students' First Amendment rights are not
clearly established with respect to university-sponsored publications, the
lack of a uniform law on the subject effectively allows university
administrators to hamper students' ability to express their ideas without
being subjected to § 1983 liability.
V. The Solution to the Hazelwood Problem
The Court should first take the issue under review (which it declined
to do in Hosty)217 and clarify whether or not Hazelwood is applicable to the
university setting. Advocates on both sides of the debate have advanced
compelling arguments.218 Given the current Court's disposition, with the
more conservative Justice Alito replacing the moderate Justice
O'Connor,219 it is likely that the Court will weigh the long-standing
tradition of substantial deference to the decisions of public school officials
more heavily than student journalists' First Amendment rights. Hence,
should the Court take up the issue, it is likely to hold that Hazelwood is
applicable to the university setting and clarify that university administrators
are entitled to the same degree of deference as high school administrators
in regulating school-subsidized publications.
However the Court rules on the issue, the key is that the Court
actually rule on the applicability of Hazelwood to the university setting.
Whether the Court applies Hazelwood to the university context,220 rejects it
as an unworkable standard for America's colleges, 22' or fashions an entirely
new standard,2 2 until the Court addresses the issue, the qualified immunity
215. The university dean had arguably exercised a prior restraint against the student
newspaper when she called the student newspaper's printer and ordered that no edition be printed
until a university official had reviewed it for content. See id. at 733, 738.
216. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738-39.
217. Id. at 731, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006).
218. See supra Part II.B.l-2.
219. David G. Savage, Enter Stage Right: Scalia is Poised to Lead; 2 Decades After Joining
Court, Justice Likely to be Pivotal Voice for Conservative Majority, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 2007, at
C4 ("the retirement of centrist Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and her replacement by Justice
Samuel Alito Jr. figure to tip the court to the right.").
220. See supra Part II.B.I.
221. See supra Part II.B.2.
222. For an example of a possible alternative standard, see Jeff Sklar, Note, The Presses
Won't Stop Just Yet: Shaping Student Speech Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood's Application to
Colleges, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 683-95 (2007).
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loophole will remain a vehicle by which unscrupulous (or simply inept)
college administrators can suppress student journalism without fear of
liability. Although student journalists' free speech rights could likely
become more constrained in non-public fora, Hazelwood would leave their
free speech rights in other fora undisturbed,a2 3 and, most importantly, close
the qualified immunity loophole. By clarifying the law with respect to the
applicability of Hazelwood to the university setting, the Court will
conclusively close the qualified immunity loophole, allowing university
student journalists to enforce their First Amendment rights when university
officials infringe upon their exercise of free speech. Until the Court
decides to examine the issue, however, university student journalists 224 are
individuals with a First Amendment right to free speech without a remedy.
223. For example, university student journalists are free to follow the well-thought-out
example set by student journalists at the University of California, Berkeley. At U.C. Berkeley,
the main student newspaper on campus, THE DAILY CALIFORNIAN, became an independent
student newspaper, run by an independent corporation, in 1971. The only remaining vestige, and
a poor one at that, of university control is that the newspaper is printed as THE DAILY
CALIFORNIAN pursuant to a licensing agreement with the University of California Board of
Regents. Even without funding from the university or the student government, THE DAILY
CALIFORNIAN has continued to publish and serve as the main paper at U.C. Berkeley. See THE
DAILY CALIFORNIAN, About the Daily Californian, http://www.dailycal.org/about.php (last
visited Mar. 8, 2007). This example offers a realistic alternative to university control should the
Court rule that Hazelwood is applicable to the university setting.
224. With the limited exception of those student journalists in states that have enacted
broader free speech protections, see supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
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